

Form 1A

Notice of Appeal to a Court of Appeals From a Judgment of a District Court

United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island
Docket Number 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

MARY SEGUIN, Plaintiff

v.

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official

Notice of Appeal

capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK, Defendants

MARY SEGUIN (name all parties taking the appeal)* appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the FIRST Circuit from the final judgment entered on October 19, 2023 (state the date the judgment was entered).

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023

* See Rule 3(c) for permissible ways of identifying appellants.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

**PLAINTIFF'S DOCKETING STATEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT AND THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT**

COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

1. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully states to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United States District Court of the District of Rhode Island that this case is related to the pending appellate case, *Mary Seguin v. Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services, et al*, Case Number 23-1851.

2. Plaintiff respectfully requests the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to review Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were filed in the U.S. District Court of the District of Rhode Island on November 16, 2023 as proper part of the record of appeal. Prior to filing this Notice of Appeal, Plaintiff also filed a Rule 60(b)(1) Motion regarding the District Court's interference with Plaintiff's right to file Rule 59 and Rule 60 post judgement in which Plaintiff sought to preserve issues for appeal on the record. Plaintiff attaches all relevant documentation, including all relevant emails to the Clerk of the Court of the District Court and Plaintiff's properly filed post judgment motions pursuant to Rule 59 and Rule 60 herein to this Notice of Appeal and Docket Statement.
3. Plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion was filed on November 16, 2023, which the District Court of Rhode Island refused to docket on the record, pursuant to instructions by Judge Smith.
4. Plaintiff's first Rule 60 Motion was filed on November 16, 2023, which the District Court of Rhode Island refused to docket on the record, pursuant to instructions by Judge Smith.
5. Plaintiff attaches the aforesaid post judgment Motions and requests appellate review under these extraordinary and troubling factual circumstances that violate and obstruct the fundamental First Amendment right of access to the Court of Record, due process and obstruction to justice in the First Circuit, and *inter alia*, interference with the accuracy of the court's record for appeal in this matter.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 16, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
Draft

Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 1:38 PM

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I spoke with Clerk Meghan today regarding an update on the docketing of my motions.

Following our discussion, I respectfully request the Clerk of the Court to docket today my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion, dated November 17, 2023, that is time-sensitive.

Please make sure that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is docketed as ECF 32.

Please make sure that the law is followed that my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion is NOT forwarded to Chambers prior to docketing. I am NOT requesting the Court leave to file, since it is my right to file the attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. No Chamber interference should be taking place to prevent the docketing of my attached Rule 60(b)(1) Motion.

Thank you for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
Houston, Texas

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

Date: Fri, Nov 17, 2023 at 12:33 PM

Subject: Fwd: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerks of the Court,

I am respectfully following up on my Rule 59 Motion filing.

Yesterday, November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, I filed via email below, my Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS. As indicated in my email below, I emphasized that docketing the Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 is urgent, to comply with the 28 day filing post-judgment deadline, which my filing meets - November 16, 2023 is within the 28 day deadline of Fed. R. of Civ. P. 59 that tolls the time for filing an appeal.

I followed up with telephone calls to the Clerk's Office at 1:32 PM Central Time, and at 3:42 PM Central Time to request timely docket of my Rule 59 Motion, and the Clerk's Office assured me each time that a deputy clerk is working on it and that it will be docketed on the day it was received and that the docket will reflect the email date stamp of the day the Rule 59 Motion is received by email. Further, I was told that **all filings** I email to the Clerk's Office will be docketed and considered by the Court as having been filed on the day that the motion was emailed to the Clerk's Office.

Therefore, my Rule 59 Motion emailed on November 16, 2023 should be accordingly docketed as **ECF 32** with the **entry of/stating filing on November 16, 2023**, in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

However, as of this time, on November 17, 2023 almost 24 hours later, my Rule 59 Motion is still not docketed.

I would like to respectfully clarify that the Text Order dated October 19, 2023 in this matter states that only my electronic filing privilege was revoked, but there is no order requiring that I need to file for leave of Court to file any post-judgment motions, such as my Rule 59 Motion.

Today, November 17, 2023, I telephoned the Clerk's Office first thing at 8:00 AM Central Time, and spoke with Clerk Meghan, who informed me that yesterday she had forwarded my Rule 59 Motion to Chambers upon receipt, but has yet to hear back from Chambers, but did not know what was causing the hold up when I asked why Chambers' response is taking almost 24 hours which impacts the docketing date of the Rule 59 Motion. I expressed my concern of the Rule 59 deadline, emphasizing that it tolls the time for filing an appeal, therefore I respectfully requested that the docket accurately reflects my timely filing of my Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023 (at 1:31 PM Central Time).

Additionally, I informed Clerk Meghan that I relied on the Clerk's Office's information provided above, and I had also filed a timely **Rule 60** Motion yesterday, **November 16, 2023**, at **4:39 PM Central Time**, similarly requesting docketing to reflect it was timely filed via email to on November 16, 2023. I emphasized to Clerk Meghan that timeliness is critical, as Rule 60 Motion filed within 28 days post-judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal. Clerk Meghan told me that my Rule 60 Motion was forwarded to Chambers as well. According to the Clerk's Office's information, my **Rule 60 Motion** needs to be docketed/filed as **ECF 33, dated stamped filed on November 16, 2023**.

Due to the above information regarding the processing of my post-judgment motions, I expressed to Clerk Megghan my concern regarding the Court's procedure of forwarding my time-sensitive post-judgment motions to Chambers without docketing/filing, and then those time-sensitive motions seemingly to languish in Chambers past the date of the 28-day deadline stipulated by Rule 59, and Rule 60 as they relate to tolling the time for filing an appeal. I expressed my explicit concern that I seek to preserve my right of appeal, and that I respectfully seek to preserve on the record the issues contained in my Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that are currently before Chambers, without docketing, by law within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island. My Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions are not ex-parte or emergency motions.

Moreover, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern that the processing of my post-judgment motions forwarded to Chambers and seemingly pending before Chambers without the motions being docketed, impacts my right of appeal 30-days post judgment, and today, Friday, is Day 29. I told the Clerk that under the circumstances in this matter, I seek to preserve for appeal the issues raised in my timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion, and that I seek to preserve my right to appeal within the 30-day postjudgment period.

I also discussed with the Clerk that my timely filed but undocketed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were forwarded to and currently before Chambers cause an uncertain effect, impacting the date of my filing of Notice of Appeal, the deadline of which is November 18, 2023, a Saturday. Based on the current facts and issues regarding simply docketing my filings on the record, I am concerned my rights of access to the Courts are impacted, and that my Notice of Appeal may also languish I do not believe any pro se litigant should be made to be uncertain of the timeliness of filing a Notice of Appeal as a matter of right that is caused by inaction by Chambers on timely-filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that toll the time to file an appeal. I explicitly expressed my concern on the effect on my access to the Courts.

I respectfully request that this email communication regarding the filing/docketing of my Rule 59 Motion be docketed to accurately reflect the record on appeal along with the Rule 59 Motion at the time the Rule 59 Motion is docketed by the Clerk.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully submitted,
Mary Seguin

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>**

Date: Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 1:31 PM

Subject: URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Dear Clerk of the Court,

Kindly urgently file today, November 16, 2023, my attached Rule 59 Motion in the above captioned case, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Because this Rule 59 Motion is time sensitive, kindly make sure that it is filed and docketed today, November 16, 2023. I do not have access to electronic filing, it appears.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016

 **CA 126 Rule 60(b)(1) Motion with Attachments FINAL 111723.pdf**
679K

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(1) MOTION

1. Plaintiff, proceeding from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4) and (6) for a new trial. Judge Smith had obstructed Plaintiff access to the Court, by instructing the Clerk of the Court, Meghan, to not docket Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions filed with the Clerk via email on November 16, 2023, as to obstruct Plaintiff's right to access the Court to preserve the issues for appeal. Plaintiff avers the following, supported by affidavit attached:

(1) On November 16, 2023, at 1:31 PM Central Time, Plaintiff filed via email to the Office of the Clerk In-Take email, Plaintiff's timely-filed Rule 59 Motion, requesting a new trial as Rule 59(e) provides. Plaintiff requested in her email that the Clerk timely docket the time-sensitive Rule 59 Motion on November 16, 2023. Plaintiff telephoned the Clerk's Office twice on November 16, 2023 to make sure of the Clerk's receipt of Plaintiff's filings, and was confirmed, and told that all motions emailed to the Clerk's Office are docketed as filed on the date stamp receipt by the Court's Clerk's Office. See attached email and email-attached Motion.

(2) On November 16, 2023, at 4:39 PM Central Time, Plaintiff filed via email to the Office of the Clerk In-Take email, Plaintiff's timely-filed Rule 60(b) Motion, requesting a new trial. Plaintiff requested in her email that the Clerk timely docket the time-sensitive Rule 60 Motion on November 16, 2023. See attached email and email-attached Motion.

(3) However, neither motions were docketed by the Clerk of the Court, and Plaintiff followed up first thing on November 17, 2023 at 8:00 AM Central Time. Plaintiff spoke to Clerk Meghan who informed Plaintiff that she had forwarded Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motion to Chambers because the Court told her to, without docketing Plaintiff's Motions. Clerk Meghan told Plaintiff she will email Chambers to "find out what is going on." No Order in this matter requires Plaintiff to file for leave of Court to file any post judgement motions, and even if leave is required, Plaintiff's court-submitted Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions seeking to preserve issues for appeal are required by law to be docketed in all courts of law to complete an accurate record for appeal.

(4) Plaintiff expressed to Clerk Meghan Plaintiff's concern that the irregular forwarding of timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion languishing in Chambers without being docketed on the record adversely impede and obstruct Plaintiff's right of access to the Court, as

well as obstructs Plaintiff's right to preserve legal issues for appeal, and fabricating an inaccurate record for appeal, as well as violates due process.

(5) At 12:20 PM, Plaintiff followed up by telephone, and was told that there were no updates from Chambers and Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions are still not docketed. Plaintiff emailed the Clerk's office documenting in writing the irregularity described above. At the very same moment, Judge Smith entered a text order stating that the Court is in receipt of two emails sent by the Plaintiff and construes them as motion for leave to file, that are denied. Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions continue to be not docketed. Plaintiff phoned the Office of the Clerk again, and the Clerk informed Plaintiff that the Court is telling her not to docket Plaintiff's Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions. This is *prima facie* judicial obstruction of Plaintiff's right to file Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions against the Plaintiff to preserve issues on the record for appeal. Plaintiff attaches herewith the aforesaid November 17, 2023 email for the record.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court to docket Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions and the aforesaid three emails to preserve the record accurately. Plaintiff requests the Court treat Plaintiff's timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion filed on November 16, 2023 as timely filed. Plaintiff requests the disqualification of Judge Smith by the Court. Plaintiff requests any and all such relief deemed just under the circumstances.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 17, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com
Phone: (281)744-2016
P.O. Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 17, 2023



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 59 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

2 messages

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
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Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016

CA 126 Plaintiff Rule 59 Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf
387K

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Therefore, my Rule 59 Motion emailed on November 16, 2023 should be accordingly docketed as **ECF 32** with the **entry of/stating filing on November 16, 2023**, in the above captioned matter, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

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Moreover, I expressed to Clerk Meghan my concern that the processing of my post-judgment motions forwarded to Chambers and seemingly pending before Chambers without the motions being docketed, impacts my right of appeal 30-days post judgment, and today, Friday, is Day 29. I told the Clerk that under the circumstances in this matter, I seek to preserve for appeal the issues raised in my timely filed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion, and that I seek to preserve my right to appeal within the 30-day postjudgment period.

I also discussed with the Clerk that my timely filed but undocketed Rule 59 Motion and Rule 60 Motion that were forwarded to and currently before Chambers cause an uncertain effect, impacting the date of my filing of Notice of Appeal, the deadline of which is November 18, 2023, a Saturday. Based on the current facts and issues regarding simply docketing my filings on the record, I am concerned my rights of access to the Courts are impacted, and that my Notice of Appeal may also languish I do not believe any pro se litigant should be made to be uncertain of the timeliness of filing a Notice of Appeal as a matter of right that is caused by inaction by Chambers on timely-filed Rule 59 and Rule 60 Motions that toll the time to file an appeal. I explicitly expressed my concern on the effect on my access to the Courts.

I respectfully request that this email communication regarding the filing/docketing of my Rule 59 Motion be docketed to accurately reflect the record on appeal along with the Rule 59 Motion at the time the Rule 59 Motion is docketed by the Clerk.

Thank you in advance for you assistance.

Respectfully submitted,
Mary Seguin
[Quoted text hidden]

 CA 126 Plaintiff Rule 59 Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf
387K



Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>

URGENT - TIME SENSITIVE - FILE TODAY RULE 60 MOTION in Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

1 message

Mary Seguin <maryseguin22022@gmail.com>
To: RID_ECF_INTAKE <RID_ECF_INTAKE@rid.uscourts.gov>

Thu, Nov 16, 2023 at 4:39 PM

Dear Clerk/Deputy Clerk of the Court,

Kindly urgently file and docket today, November 16, 2023, my attached Rule 60(b) Motion in the above captioned case, Seguin v. Ri Dept of Human Services et al, Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS.

Because this Rule 60(b) Motion is time sensitive, kindly make sure that it is filed and docketed today, November 16, 2023. I do not have access to electronic filing, it appears.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Respectfully Submitted,
Mary Seguin
PO Box 22022
Houston, TX 77019
(281) 244-2016

CA 126 Rule 60(b) Motion with Affidavit 111623.pdf
379K

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

1. Plaintiff, proceeding from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59 for a new trial. Plaintiff avers the following, supported by affidavit attached: The 91-page First Amended Complaint [ECF 25] filed on September 1, 2023 seeks monetary damages against the Rhode Island State Defendants and the private actor Defendants for:

- (1) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' monopoly of publication of law.

(2) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' denial to the Public and to all Pro Se Litigants all access and the denial of free access to the contents of the law created, authored, and deliberated by the Rhode Island Judiciary.

(3) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate the legacy electronic court case management systems used by Rhode Island Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services during the implementation of Odyssey from 2013 to 2014 (the State's official electronic court filing and electronic case management system), so that these state agencies' filings are discriminately invisible only to the Public, to Pro Se Litigants and to the Rhode Island Virtual Clerk of the Courts in the Rhode Island Family Court, a limited jurisdiction court of record. The State's filings are only visible to the judges and to the State filers, thus manipulating the proceeding towards a foregone conclusion in favor of the State filers.

(4) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to misrepresent to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigants that the implemented electronic court case records of judge created laws are available to *all* court users, in order to cover up their monopolization of the publication of law denies the Public and the Pro Se Litigant access to the judge-created laws.

(5) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services that the State routinely establishes and enforces 12% compound interest on child and spousal support in Title IV of the Social Security Act state family court proceedings, in violation of the uniform statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and

if the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% simple interest, *not* 12% compound interest, targeting noncustodial parents victims. In welfare cases, support are assigned by the custodial parent to the State, and the 12% compound interest represents a fee for the State's "services" in the support's establishment and enforcement paid to the State, which at 12% compound interest represents lucrative, illegally obtained revenue to the State actors, who are financially incentivized to obtain as much as possible.

(6) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate Odyssey with the State's legacy electronic court filing system resulting in the State's filings seeking illegal 12% compound interest, as well as to deny the Public and to Pro Se Litigants' access to their publication of judge-created law records for the purpose of cover up of this wholesale illegal defraud of the court, extortionary defraud under color of state law targeting the unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims, and defraud of the United States (66% of the cost of these child support "operations" is funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through Title IV of the Social Security Act through funds appropriated by Congress through the annual budget appropriations.)

(7) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to operate the Title IV Program of the Social Security Act in all manners violative of due process, *in prima facie* due process violative State Electronic Courts, for the purpose of generating state revenue through fraud and deceit, through conspired tortious interference of rights of access to the courts, rights of

access to state case documents, and rights of access to judge-created laws targeting litigants, targeting the Public and targeting Pro Se Litigants.

(8) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to cover up their public-access-denied publication of state judge-created laws of illegal 12% compound interest benefiting the state's revenue by adopting a State policy not to establish nor enforce any interest in *interstate* support cases only, calculated to cover up the collective fraud from federal enforcement officials and other states' enforcement officials of court orders (laws) showing 12% compounded interest established and funded under Title IV that are facially illegally violative of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) which explicitly provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between *3% to 6% simple interest, not 12% compound interest*. The federal Title IV Program regulation by Congressional intent explicitly preempts any related state laws of all participating states.

(9) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Barbara Grady and Gero Meyersiek to use the fraudulent, First Amendment-, Fourth Amendment-, Fifth Amendment-, Seventh Amendment-, and Fourteenth Amendment violative state court machinery weaponizing Title IV Program of the Social Security Act to target the Plaintiff *pro se* noncustodial parent in Texas to retaliate against Plaintiff for her past lawsuits against them, namely ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al. Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al. Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state

court's under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if Plaintiff wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's **retaliation** damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it").

(10) The Rhode Island Judiciary continues the pattern of cover up by denying Plaintiff's request for public judicial records related to the monopoly of publication of judge-created records submitted to the State Judiciary pursuant to the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act ("RI APRA").

4. Plaintiff obtained new evidence on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary is a former client of Judge Smith, and on November 9, 2023, Plaintiff obtained new evidence that the

Rhode Island Judiciary remains a major client of Judge Smith's former law firm. Plaintiff's due diligence search for conflict of interest has been impeded by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of judge-created laws in the state's electronic court system and their denial of access to the judge-created laws, and Plaintiff, as a member of the Public and proceeding pro se without a Rhode Island Attorney license, the issuance of which is also monopolized by the Rhode Island Judiciary, has further been denied access to official records, including through the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act, consistent with a pattern of civil conspiracy cover up.

5. A new trial or a stay of the Judgment is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiff, and to Americans across the First Circuit who would be needlessly deprived of access to the federal courts of law in the First Circuit for monetary damages redress - the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention that functioned as a court of equity - regarding Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' scheme to monopolize the publication of judge-created laws that denies, tortiously interferes, tortiously abridges and tortiously obstruct the Public access to those very laws; regarding Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services' unlawful seizures of interstate Texas properties outside of Rhode Island under color of Rhode Island state law based on legally insufficient interest charge on overdue support based on the unlawful rate of 12% compound interest that is disallowed under Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% simple interest, not 12% compound interest. And this is on top of Defendants' breach of contract that was brokered by Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services on behalf of the agency's client; the contract between the custodial parent client, defendant Gero

Meyersiek and the Texas Plaintiff stipulated that the custodial parent waived interest upon the Texas Plaintiff paying a lump sum of \$104,185.98 pay-off amount, which Plaintiff performed from Texas on December 7, 2021. Even at the point of contractual agreement, Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services in conjunction with Defendant Gero Meyersiek, misrepresented there was lawful and enforceable interest to be waived, as they removed the accrued interest from the Title IV-D Program mandated support record system in order to cover up from the Plaintiff, and from federal and Texas authorities the unlawful 12% compound rate. After fraudulently inducing Plaintiff in Texas to agree to and to perform on the contract, the Defendants immediately put the interest back into the Title IV-D Program-mandated automated support record system and started to seize Plaintiff's properties in Texas under color of Rhode Island state law.

6. The final judgment is on its face violative of binding First Circuit caselaw that mandates lower courts to *stay* monetary damages claims when applying Younger Abstention. See *DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) in holding that abstention does not allow for dismissal of damages claim).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) has been in effect since the enactment of the Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act several decades ago, and Congress's original intent was to combat poverty within the populace of single mothers and children in welfare cases; Congress at no time intended to shift the undue burden of Rhode Island's 12% compound interest on overdue support under color of Rhode Island state law to noncustodial parents, whether targeting Texas or across the country, which in welfare cases Rhode Island converts the 12% compound interest to assigned debts owed by noncustodial parents to Rhode Island's state agencies and state

government, representing underhanded unlawful state revenue unlawfully obtained through the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, targeting unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims. As a legal point of a state's lawful application of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the First Circuit, New Hampshire, in compliance with the letter of federal law, opts into Title IV-D Program and opts not to charge any interest whatsoever, as per the letter of law and the original intent of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). Similarly, Texas charges 6% in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A).

8. Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Service's illegal denial and obstruction of access to Plaintiff's own child support case file that contains the incriminating illegal and arguably criminal scheme of removing the interest rate from the Title IV-D Program mandated and federally funded support record system to cover up the unlawful 12% compound interest from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from the Plaintiff in Texas, violates due process, obstructs justice, obstructs a federally funded and federal program proceeding, and the legal framework of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666.

9. Judge Smith's dismissal of Texas Plaintiff's legal remedy monetary damages and breach of contract fraudulent inducement damages claims under Younger Abstention in this Court of law represents irreparable harm violative of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment and the First Amendment access to the Court. The undisputable fact remains, Plaintiff's legal remedy request for monetary damages in this court of law consisting of twenty-two causes of action that cannot be dismissed under Younger Abstention, namely monetary damages claims of breach of contract fraudulent inducement, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation,

negligent misrepresentation, intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation, common law bad faith, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, breach of fraudulent concealment/common law fraud, concealed fraud, tort of deceit, reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, abuse of process, breach of duty, accounting fraud, fraud cover up, RI Government Tort Liability (R.I. Gen. Laws 9-31-1, *et seq.*), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Reckless Indifference of Plaintiff's Clearly Established Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of Fourth Amendment Illegal Seizure of Plaintiff's Texas Property, state tort of liability against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil RICO [ECF 25].

10. Judge Smith's legally-unsupported and factually-unsupported, and "legally insufficient" opinion that the limited jurisdiction family court is an adequate forum to raise Plaintiff's federal legal damages claims of breach of contract et al., contravenes Rhode Island law: R.I. Gen Laws 8-10-3 makes clear that family court is not a court of general jurisdiction, can only conduct bench trials functioning as a court of equity, not of law, and prohibits family court from exercising jurisdiction over breach of contract claims et al between the Texas Plaintiff and the Defendants; family court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's federal causes of actions; lacks the jurisdiction to summon a jury for jury trial in a court of law.

11. Finally, but equally critically, twenty-one days post judgment Plaintiff discovered troubling new evidence on November 9, 2023, that Judge Smith appears to have impermissibly acted in favor of the interests of the defendants – he is automatically disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455, because as a partner in his past practice and firm, the state government and the Rhode Island Judiciary were not only his clients, but continue to be that firm's major client under a flat fee contract and he has knowledge of the defendants' actions in this action – as a major

partner in his firm, the Rhode Island Judiciary is his and his firm's past and current clients, the state government actors and the state courts actors, cooperate in the routine establishment and enforcement of 12% compound interest under the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, where 12% compound interest is disallowed under 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). To the objective observer, having knowledge of the facts and circumstances of this case, and being a partner in his past firm that continues to have the Rhode Island Judiciary as a client, Judge Smith appears biased in favor of the defendants' interest to continue raking in state revenue under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21))(A) that explicitly disallows state debts of 12% compound interest assigned to Rhode Island that the state actors who cover up the 12% compound rate by obstructing the noncustodial parent's access to her own child support case file that is further violative of the due process provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 654 and §666, in Rhode Island's federally funded operation with funds appropriated by Congress intended for the *lawful* operation of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Although under the judicial self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. §455, the Texas Plaintiff is not expected to cull court records in the Rhode Island state courts for judicial conflict of interest, nevertheless the Plaintiff in good faith and diligently attempted to perform a remote search of Rhode Island's electronic court case management system, Odyssey in 2023. In so doing, Plaintiff discovered troubling newly-discovered evidence that the Rhode Island Judiciary, while publicly representing that the 2014 \$6 million state transition from paper courts to electronic courts promises *all court users* will be able to call up court documents remotely from their mobile devices, in reality Rhode Island adopted rules only denying the public and pro se litigants remote access to court case information, including pro-se litigants' own case records, that both the public and all litigants had equal statutory, common law and constitutional rights of access in paper courts – Judge

Smith's firm's clients, the Rhode Island Judiciary, therefore implemented electronic court public access denials that obstructed Plaintiff's and the public's discovery of Judge Smith's judicial disqualification regarding his former clients such as the state courts, the defendant state actors and other conflict entities.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

11. The United States Supreme Court in 2020 reaffirmed, in *GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC*, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), the century-old government edicts doctrine, making clear that officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot monopolize access—the works they create in the course of their official duties. The U.S. Supreme Court previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal materials when created by judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law shall not monopolize access to it. *See Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888). Tyler Technologies is a for profit organization that aims to facilitate public access to government judge-created records and legal materials. Tyler Technologies is contracted by the Rhode Island Judiciary to implement the State's electronic courts in 2013 and together, they both publicly represented that access to the contents of judge-created laws records will be readily called on mobile devices to *all* court users, namely, to the Public and to pro se litigators.

12. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their official duties as judges. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. In *Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888) the Supreme Court concluded that “the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor. *Banks*, 128 U. S. at 253 (emphasis in original).

Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” *Ibid.* (citing *Nash v. Lathrop*, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N. E. 559 (1886)). These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253. This rule applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). *Ibid.* The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show . . . that all should have free access” to its contents. *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (cited by *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253–254). Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. *Ibid.* (emphasis added). Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law, their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and must be “free for publication to all.” *Ibid.*

13. Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of the judge-created laws and their “whole works” making and interpreting the law that explicitly by design deny access to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigant runs afoul of the government edicts doctrine.

14. Courts have long understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. See, e.g., *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (judicial opinions and statutes stand “on substantially the same footing” for purposes of the government edicts doctrine); moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as judges,”

Banks, 128 U. S., at 253, it applies to whatever work judges perform in their capacity as judges. *Banks*, following *Wheaton* and the “judicial consensus” it inspired, denied publication monopoly protection to judicial opinions without excepting concurrences and dissents that carry no legal force. 128 U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted). As every judge learns the hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.” *Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980). Yet such comments are covered by the government edicts doctrine because they come from an official with authority to make and interpret the law. Indeed, *Banks* went even further and withheld publication monopoly protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges. 128 U. S., at 253. Surely these supplementary materials do not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doctrine. The simplest explanation is the one *Banks* provided: These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity. See *ibid.* The textual basis for the doctrine is the “authorship” requirement, which unsurprisingly focuses on—the author, the judges. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted the ‘author’ to be officials empowered to speak with the force of law. The doctrine distinguishes between some authors (who are empowered to speak with the force of law) and others (who are not). The Supreme Court explicitly rejects allowing the States to “monetize its entire suite of legislative and judicial history. With today’s *digital tools*, States might even launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.” See *Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020) It is obviously explicitly clear that the Supreme Court refers to the prohibition against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s monopolization of the digital publication of DIGITAL COURT JUDICIAL COURT RECORDS that denies publication access of judge-created laws and their work materials to the Public and to Pro Se Litigants.

15. There is no legitimate Rhode Island government interest in the knowing illegal denial of access to the public and to pro se litigants the digital records of the Rhode Island Judiciary's and Tyler Technologies' illegal monopolization of digital publication of judge-created laws involving the establishment nor enforcement of unlawful 12% compound interest violative of explicitly clear 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the legal framework of Title IV-D Program targeting noncustodial parties in Texas who are outside of Rhode Island that Rhode Island already knows is unenforceable in Texas, and thus had removed the 12% compound interest in 2018 calculated to cover it up from federal and Texas authorities. Rhode Island's abuse of the legal framework of the government edict doctrine and the legal framework of Title IV-D Program are diametrically at odds with the intent of Congress and binding caselaws of the U.S. Supreme Court. The civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal machinery of the digital electronic courts in Rhode Island is clear. *See Turner v. Rogers*, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). *See Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020); *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, Section 8: Child Support Enforcement Program, in 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-1, 8-2 (2004). *See* Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351. Where the mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to the government for that amount. In cases where the mother is not dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the fray. *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, *supra* note 38. Yet, this case does not involve a welfare case, as the custodial father is wealthy, but the Defendants are motivated by retaliation against the Plaintiff for suing them ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian

et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state court's under color of state law abuse of the legal framework of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if she wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's retaliation damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse *sua sponte*, where necessary, even if no party has requested it").

II. ARGUMENT

16. Plaintiff has appealed the Court's/Judge Smith's judgment in its entirety in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023) and respectfully submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's

holding that the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention applies to the *dismissal* of her monetary damages and breach of contract damages claims.

17. Plaintiff further submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's in this case.

18. Conducting state proceedings funded by federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV of the Social Security Act in state monopolized electronic courts that violate the long-established government edict doctrine as it related to the Public's access of the digital publication of judge-created laws and violate the Constitution targeting Texas assets and Texas parties for illegal 12% compound interest involving fraudulent inducement that cannot be enforceable in Texas is the *prima facie* example of government fraud and government waste, warranting cut off from federal funding at the very minimum. Not even Judge Smith, friend of the Rhode Island Judiciary, can punt these egregious state activities to later addressment via the attention of the Supreme Court and to Congress Appropriation Committees, wrongfully using Younger Abstention.

19. Judge Smith's holding is defect in claiming without a shred of factual basis that Plaintiff can raise her federal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract claims in the jurisdictionally defective Rhode Island family court, that R.I. Gen. Laws 8-10-3 plainly states the family court is ***not*** a court of general jurisdiction, and which lacks the jurisdiction over the controversy for legal relief of monetary damages tort claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims over both the Plaintiff and all the named defendants.

20. Plaintiff seeks a new trial or a stay pending appeal as Plaintiff's likelihood of success on appeal, together with the lopsided balance of hardships, weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay being sought pending appellate review.

A. Plaintiff is Likely To Succeed On Appeal Of the Judgment Ordered By the Court:

21. Although Plaintiff recognizes that the Court has ruled against her as to the scope of relief, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on appeal of those issues, and has raised serious legal questions and presented a substantial case. *See Arnold v. Garlock, Inc.*, 278 F.3d 426, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001).

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference her prior remedy arguments. Plaintiff reserves the right to make any and all arguments on appeal.

23. Among the substantial questions raised by Plaintiff is whether the Court erred in awarding Defendants dismissal of Plaintiff's monetary damages claim in this First Circuit under Younger Abstention and erred in failing to self-execute 28 U.S.C. § 455. And Plaintiff respectfully submits that she is likely to succeed on appeal in arguing that, in these circumstances, dismissal was not properly ordered in the particular circumstances of this case pursuant to established binding First Circuit caselaws on both the Court's errors applying Younger Abstention as well as judicial disqualification. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997); *In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998); *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996). *See also Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry*, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). ("Younger abstention does not apply to claims for monetary damages.")

24. Absence of a new trial or a stay of the judgment will erode confidence in the Judiciary in the First Circuit by creating an impression that it is violating national law regarding the government edict doctrine and setting illegal new national policy regarding the Title IV-D Program. It may also have the effect of “encouraging forum shopping.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). It further “undermines the judicial system’s goals of allowing the ‘airing of competing views’ and permitting multiple judges and circuits to weigh in on significant issues.” See also *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (traditional remedial principles account for “the public interest” and “the balance of equities”); *EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA*, 795 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.) (declining to vacate unlawful agency action under the APA because “vacatur could cause substantial disruption”). In this context, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state government tort monetary damages claims entered by the Court could cause substantial disruption to the *uniform* application of the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program Congress explicitly intended.

25. The serious legal questions raised in this case regarding the scope of remedy go beyond the questions of whether a Younger abstention is applicable to federal monetary damages claims and or the feeble assertion of *comity* applied to the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s gross violation of the government edict doctrine—and indeed, those questions should not have even entered into this case. Here, among Plaintiff’s challenges was to state Judiciary, Tyler Technologies and agency actions, and Plaintiff pursued fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims and tort monetary damages claims. Instead, the Court at law cannot vacate a federal statute—i.e., cannot “delete a previously enacted statute from the books” such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va.

L. Rev. 933, 936 (2018) (“The federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited.” (footnotes omitted). Legal monetary damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would hold the Rhode Island state government accountable under the Rhode Island Government Tort Act for Rhode Island government actors’ tortious actions violating the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program federal statutes targeting the Plaintiff in Texas was a legal remedy conferred by Congress to federal courts to grant legal relief appropriate in this case. The Court has an unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction conferred to it by Congress. *See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)

26. With respect, although the Court has entered a judgment otherwise, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Final Judgment sufficient to justify a stay of the judgment.

B. The Balance of the Equities Overwhelmingly Favors the Requested New Trial or Stay

27. The balance of the equities overwhelmingly favors a new trial or stay: The State of Rhode Island plainly lacks any legitimate interest in the State’s systemic knowing violation of the government edict doctrine and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that they now target Plaintiff in Texas, and which they sought to cover up from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from Plaintiff, by knowingly and unlawfully removing interest from the automated support record system. Americans outside of Rhode Island re fraudulently, unlawfully and systemically fleeced by Rhode Island’s illegal scheme that is illegally funded through the State’s defrauding of the United States lying to the United States that these activities are eligible for federal funds

appropriated by Congress for the legal administration of Title IV Program of the Social Security Act.

28. Defendants will face no harm from Plaintiff's requested new trial or stay. The judgment that is specifically directed to and protects the prevailing Defendants from legal accountability of their illegal actions, is further issued by a disqualified judge, Judge Smith, who was the former counsel for the Defendants and a partner of the firm whose major client is the Rhode Island Judiciary, e.g., Rhode Island state government entities, including the state courts and state agencies. The requested new trial or stay will thus impose no hardship on the prevailing Defendants at all.

29. By contrast, the public and the Plaintiff face significant harm if now new trial is ordered or the judgment is not stayed. As an initial matter, "any time a [government]" violates "statutes enacted by representatives of its people," the people "suffer a form of irreparable injury." *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted). But the harm here is much greater and more far-reaching. The government edict doctrine is willfully violated by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology in a civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal state family court creating judge-created laws ordering and enforcing 12% compound interest, aided and abetted by the Department of Human Services - Title IV-D requires the uniform application and compliance by participating States with the Social Security Act. Congress's as well as the United States through the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' interest in the uniform compliance of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A), § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666 are well established. The States are reimbursed 66% of the cost of operations through federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The Defendants' arbitrary illegal removal of the illegal unenforceable 12%

compound interest from the automated support record system and cover up of their illegal 12% compound interest scheme from the federal and Texas authorities targeting Texas properties and targeting the Plaintiff in Texas demonstrates Rhode Island government agencies (who are former clients of Judge Smith) knowingly committed criminal schemes illegally seizing Plaintiff's properties interstate in Texas that they know are violative of federal criminal codes and Texas civil and penal codes. *See, e.g.*, Social Services Amendments of 1974 (1975 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351 (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) (adding Title IV-D to the Social Security Act). The program, which is administered by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), provides that States with approved plans for child and spousal support that meet federal requirements are reimbursed by the federal government for a significant sixty-six percent (66%) of the costs of operating their child-support enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. §v655(a)(2)(C). In 1975, Congress adopted Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. §v651 et seq., and established the general statutory framework that exists today. See 1975 Act § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351; *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329, 333-335 (1997) (describing program). Congress ultimately set the federal share of reimbursable expenditures at 66%, 42 U.S.C. 655(a)(2), but expanded the availability of matching funds at the 90% level for State expenditures for automating data processing systems to improve “the monitoring of support payments, the maintenance of accurate records regarding the payment of support. Therefore, the Defendants’ illegal operations cannot be funded by Congressional appropriations.

30. Judge Smith’s failure to self-execute his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 as well as Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then his subsequent refusal to recuse in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023), upon Plaintiff’s request after she raised newly discovered discovery post judgment

on October 6, 2023 of his direct and past public sector law practice's contract legal representation of the Defendants, state courts, state agencies and other conflict entities, have the appearance, to the objective observer, of the Court's issuance of judgment in favor of the Defendants in error that contravenes established First Circuit case law on Younger Abstention as well as disqualification, calculated to benefit the interests of his former clients, as partner of his former firm that represents the Rhode Island Judiciary and the state government.

31. Moreover, the Court's judgment effectively functions as a denial of Plaintiff's access to this Court of law to redress her legal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims. It is well-settled that even minimal loss of First Amendment freedoms, "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976) (plurality); see also *Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 373.; *N.Y. Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971). Accordingly, Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, and a stay will not injure others while furthering the public interest.

III. CONCLUSION

27. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Judgment ordered, and has demonstrated that the balance of the equities favors a new trial or a stay. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the final judgment for the duration of appellate proceedings relating to the related Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 16, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 16, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

**MARY SEGUIN'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RULE 59
MOTION**

I, MARY SEGUIN, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746(2) that the following statements are true and correct:

1. That I am the Plaintiff, Pro Se, in the above captioned matter.
2. That I exercised, am exercising and continue to exercise my statutory right to appear pro se party in the above captioned civil matter in federal court by statute 28 U.S.C. sec. 1654.

3. That in state proceedings in Rhode Island, I am required to comply with Rhode Island Article X. Rules Governing Electronic Filing, Rule 2. Official Court Record, (a) Official Court Record. “Upon the implementation of the Electronic Filing System (“EFS”) in each court, all documents shall be filed electronically and shall be the official court record.”
4. That the state proceedings in which I am a party are public and are not about child custody nor involve a minor.
5. That the **Rhode Island Family Court**, through its adoption and promulgation of **Administrative Order 2021-01 A2**) mandated that all child support interest matters shall be heard remotely via WebEx. Further, **Administrative Order 2021-01 B1**) mandated that all non-emergency filings shall be filed using the electronic filing system in accordance with the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, which is the **Odyssey system**.
6. That the **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION, Rule 5. Access to Case Information, (c) Remote Access to Case Information. (1) Policy. To allow limited Remote Access to the Database through the Public Portal. Non-public case types shall not be remotely accessible except for certain case types to attorneys who have entered an appearance in a case. (2) Content. (a) The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information”** bar, deny, violate, abridge, infringe and interfere with Pro Se Litigants’ and the Public’s fundamental rights to access public court records and Pro Se Litigants’ fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. See **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” Rule 5(c)(2)(a)** **“The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information.”** See also **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY, Access to Case Information, 2. Remote Access to Case Information A. The Public, Self-represented Litigants, and Parties to a Case, The public, self-represented litigants, and parties in a case shall have remote access to the register of actions or docket but shall not have remote access to other electronic case information.”**
7. That I, the Plaintiff, learned and verified on July 10, 2023 directly from the Rhode Island Judiciary itself through numerous (14) correspondences with the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023, pursuant to my RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) request for public records from the Rhode Island Judiciary, that as a matter of State policy, State Court Rule, and Judiciary Rule, in the digital courts implemented by the Rhode Island Judiciary, the State Court, the Rhode Island

Judiciary deny remote digital access of the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopolized publication of court and judicial records using the digital tool maintained and published by Tyler Technologies, Odyssey, including judge-created, judge-authored court decisions arising from state proceedings in the State's digital electronic courts, and digital court transcripts ordered by and paid by pro-se litigants that are published by the Judiciary digitally on Tyer Technologies' Odyssey are also denied access to the Public, pro-se litigants, and parties to the litigation (who are represented by counsel). The Rhode Island State Court only grants remote access to digital court and judicial records created by judges produced in digital courts to Rhode Island attorneys and state and federal agencies that are approved by the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopoly. On this matter, I corresponded in writing fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023.

8. That the State Defendants in this matter electronically file all notices using another electronic filing system that is even separate and different from the EFS (Odyssey).
9. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not noticed to me in Texas.
10. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not visible to me on the Rhode Island courts' EFS.
11. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by me, solely because I am a self-represented litigant.
12. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by the public, by self-represented litigants, nor by parties to the case, but can be accessed remotely and instantly through the internet by attorneys in Rhode Island and state and federal agencies.
13. That the Rhode Island Court Clerks state to me over the phone that they are prohibited from reading the contents of the court records over the phone to me.
14. That the Rhode Island Court virtual clerks state to me over the phone that even they are unable to see or access the court record information of filings by the State Defendants from the virtual clerks' access portals.
15. That the Rhode Island Electronic Filing System, case management system, rules and practices outright and unconstitutionally restrict and deny access to the court to three classes: (1) the public; (2) pro-se litigants; (3) parties to the case (who are represented by counsel), and is obviously outright reserved for only the government and Rhode Island attorneys.
16. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS.
17. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and

withdrew from my-initiated RI EOHHS agency appeal in 2022 in a scheme to procure a favorable judgment in a state proceeding that deny my federal constitutional and due process rights in Texas.

18. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and initiated the family court state proceeding on January 31, 2023 before the Covid Emergency Declaration was lifted.
19. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that appear to **only allow remote, instant and full court access to a restricted club of R.I. lawyers and the government**, pose unconstitutional and undue burden on me, a citizen of Texas over 2,500 miles away.
20. That the State Defendant have full knowledge of the egregiously unfair due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that deny me access to the required electronic court transcripts prepared by the court reporter and electronically filed in the state EFS that **I ordered and paid for** for appeal, but the State Defendants have instant remote access by state court design.
21. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the above unconstitutional restriction on access to court records and information to the public and non-lawyers is deliberate, by design and calculated to be unfair, violating constitutional guarantees of full and fair opportunity to raise claims in state proceedings.
22. That the above-raised unconstitutional restrictions are not exhaustive.
23. That my federal monetary damages claims on the unconstitutionality of the Rhode Island state court rules, practices and proceedings that violate the government edict doctrine and violate the pro-se litigants', such as my-self, federal constitutional rights: (1) federal constitutional right of equal access to the courts, (2) federal constitutional right to equal access to court records to receive information on the contents of all electronically filed notices, pleadings, court decisions, and transcripts that I myself ordered and paid for for appeal that are required to be electronically filed by state court rules and practices, (3) federal constitutional due process right and equal right to be given equal and timely notice of electronic filings and entries by the courts (including court decisions, court orders, court judgments, full docket entries, etc.) that the Rhode Island Judiciary deliberately deny by category all pro-se litigants access to court information, namely the contents of judicial/court records of cases to which I am the self-represented party, (4) federal constitutional due process right to be heard (Rhode Island Superior Court threatens me, the Texas pro-se plaintiff, with denial of my request to conduct WebEx hearings for the purpose of denying the Texas pro-se litigant access to the court and to be heard), (5) federal constitutional due process right to decision by a neutral decision-maker (the court that denies pro-se litigant

access to the court and the corollary opportunity to be heard fails the neutral decision-maker test). This list is not exhaustive.

24. That I seek to sue in federal court the State Defendants and add additional defendants.
25. I am an out-of-state diversity and a pro-se litigant in two state proceedings in Rhode Island, and have been unconstitutionally singled out by the State Judiciary, by category “self-represented litigant,” to be barred from accessing electronic case information authored by judges and which the Judiciary has a monopoly in the publication of the judge-created laws in which state court cases I am the pro-se party, and therefore have standing to raise claims against this unconstitutional state practice and unconstitutional state court practice and rules. I understand the Rhode Island Judiciary’s monopoly in the digital publication of judge-created laws in the Judiciary’ implemented digital/electronic courts and the Judiciary’s denial to the Public and to me from accessing the monopolized electronic publication of the judge-created laws in the court records violate the government edict doctrine.
26. Additionally, my fundamental First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and common law right to equal, meaningful, and timely access to judicial records and public court records in litigation, given timely notice, adequate opportunity to be heard and to decision by a neutral decision-maker are fundamental First and Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Critically, the unconstitutional abridgement, infringement, and denial of judicial and court records to out-of-state pro-se litigants by the Rhode Island State Courts, Rhode Island State Judiciary and the Rhode Island Superior Court Bench Bar Committee directly relate to Younger Abstention Exception.
27. The State Defendants deliberately file all the State’s pleadings outside of the State’s electronic filing system, “Odyssey,” and deliberately use a wholly different un-named electronic filing system, different and separate from that (“Odyssey”) provided for pro-se litigants, so that pro-se litigants do not receive any requisite automated electronic notices of court motions or pleadings the State Defendants file electronically, nor are pro se litigants able to electronically access the content information of the State Defendants’ electronically-filed pleadings. The only way the pro se litigant, such as me, the Texas Plaintiff, can access the court record is to personally go over 2,500 miles away to the courthouse in Rhode Island to access the court pleading information, or get a “courtesy notice” via email or get a “courtesy notice” through U.S. Mail sent by the State Defendants at whim. The State Defendants deliberately fail to send the notices electronically or by U.S. Mail, and the state courts deliberately promulgated court rules disallowing the public, pro-se litigants and even the parties who are represented by lawyers, remote access to court records, and critically, deny access to crucial court decisions, judgments and orders of public cases, as well as deny remote access to the transcripts ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal. Critically, the State court’s abridgment and denial of access to court documents to the pro se litigant and the general public result in the

unconstitutional abridgment and denial of equal, timely and meaningful access to court complaints, decisions, judgments and orders. What is truly shocking is that the Rhode Island Judiciary even denies and/or bars pro-se litigants remote access of court transcripts that were ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal.

28. Thirdly, the Texas Pro-Se Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 7, 2023, that the Rhode Island Judiciary, using the aforesaid state court rule barring, by category, pro-se litigants from accessing court case information remotely, bars the Plaintiff by category (“self-represented litigant”) from accessing state court proceeding transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. In other words, the RI Supreme Court Clerk stated to the Texas Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, in Texas, is unconstitutionally barred from remotely accessing the transcripts of court proceedings that she ordered and paid for in her appeal to the RI Supreme Court in the Plaintiff-initiated APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**, and yet the State Defendants are inequitably granted instant and free remote access to those very transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. The federal Texas Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the verified facts.
29. Fourthly, the Texas Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 11, 2023, that, despite the Texas Plaintiff’s several phone inquiries to the RI Superior Court in the past several weeks regarding the status of the appeal, the RI Superior Court, for undisclosed reasons, failed and continue to fail to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the court case file of **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** to the RI Supreme Court within the requisite 60 days after Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023, as required by the RI Supreme Court rules and procedures. At the same time, the Texas Plaintiff verified the fact that the Plaintiff-ordered transcripts of the state proceedings in the Federal Plaintiff-initiated state APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** show the RI Superior Court further unconstitutionally sought to deny the Texas Plaintiff access to the state court and opportunity to be heard by outright threatening the Plaintiff in open court that the Judge, David Cruise, during the hearing of March 24, 2023 in that matter, shall use the state court’s discretionary power in the future to deny all of the Texas pro-se Plaintiff’s petitions for remote WebEx hearings to effectively deny her access to the state superior court. The state court that denies court access and the opportunity to be heard fails the neutral-decision-maker test required under the Fourteenth Amendment. I now specifically request further the Court to judicially notice that this court access denial and denial to be heard occurred on March 24, 2023, PRIOR to President Biden’s lifting of the COVID-19 National Health Emergency Declaration. I, the Texas Plaintiff, aver this is a direct contributory reason for the RI Superior Court’s failure to transfer the case file to the Supreme Court within 60 days (by June 3, 2023) of the Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023 in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**.

30. Fifthly, the Plaintiff presents to this Court and respectfully requests the Court to take judicial notice of the undisputed fact of the court rule-making process in Rhode Island. The 1966 Rules were promulgated by the justices of the superior court pursuant to section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island. This enabling act departed from the Federal Rules Enabling Act and most state enabling legislation conferring rule-making power on the supreme courts of the respective governments. The Rhode Island Enabling Act was adopted in 1940, 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 943, sec. 1. It conferred the power on the justices of the superior court and the 1966 reform was the product of that court. In 1969 an amendment to section 8-6-2 made the Rules thereafter adopted by the trial courts subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 239, sec 2. Therefore, all public records relating to the adoption and promulgation of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” are “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or “public body” means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”). Even though the Rhode Island Enabling Act conferred the power on the judiciary public body to promulgate and adopt court rules, a.k.a. rule-making process, the Rhode Island Judiciary, pursuant to the Plaintiff’s APRA request for public records, denied the Plaintiff’s APRA request within the 10 business day period, as well as denies it possesses public records, as defined by APRA, relating to the rule-making process by the judiciary of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” including denying possession of public records that show the intent of the rule-makers to promulgate and adopt court rules denying fundamental right of public access to electronic case information remotely to the public, to self-represented litigants, and to parties to a case. See Exhibit D fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails between the Plaintiff and/with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023. The Texas pro-se Plaintiff respectfully requests the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the newly verified facts and claims, and amend the complaint, which is further in the interest of judicial economy. The Plaintiff further seeks to appeal and file her claim against the implausible denial by the RI Judiciary, which is conferred by the Rhode Island Enabling Act to make rules of the court, that it possesses public records relating to the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” that the judiciary, conferred power by the Rhode Island Enabling Act, “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or “public body” means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to

Public Records Act (“APRA”). Because the RI Superior Court clearly ruled in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear my/the Texas Plaintiff’s APRA-related claims, I, the Texas Plaintiff, now exercise my statutory and constitutional rights to petition this Federal Court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that provides supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims that arose from the same common nuclei of facts, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. I, the Plaintiff, respectfully request this Court for the extension of time to file my claims.

31. Plaintiff discovered on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are former clients of Judge Smith, a partner in his former firm, Edwards & Angell.
32. Plaintiff discovered on November 9, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are current clients of the firm Edwards & Angell, the former firm of Judge Smith, a partner in the firm.
33. A plain reading of 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 makes clear that Judge Smith is disqualified from this case, and a plain reading of case law makes clear that 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 is self-executing, without necessitating any party’s request.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: November 16, 2023

MARY SEGUIN

Mary Seguin

Mary Seguin

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

maryseguin22022@gmail.com

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b) MOTION

1. Plaintiff, proceeding from and as a citizen of Texas, respectfully requests pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4) and (6) for a new trial. Plaintiff avers the following, supported by affidavit attached: The 91-page First Amended Complaint [ECF 25] filed on September 1, 2023 seeks monetary damages against the Rhode Island State Defendants and the private actor Defendants for:

- (1) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' monopoly of publication of law.

(2) The Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' denial to the Public and to all Pro Se Litigants all access and the denial of free access to the contents of the law created, authored, and deliberated by the Rhode Island Judiciary.

(3) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate the legacy electronic court case management systems used by Rhode Island Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services during the implementation of Odyssey from 2013 to 2014 (the State's official electronic court filing and electronic case management system), so that these state agencies' filings are discriminately invisible only to the Public, to Pro Se Litigants and to the Rhode Island Virtual Clerk of the Courts in the Rhode Island Family Court, a limited jurisdiction court of record. The State's filings are only visible to the judges and to the State filers, thus manipulating the proceeding towards a foregone conclusion in favor of the State filers.

(4) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies to misrepresent to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigants that the implemented electronic court case records of judge created laws are available to *all* court users, in order to cover up their monopolization of the publication of law denies the Public and the Pro Se Litigant access to the judge-created laws.

(5) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services that the State routinely establishes and enforces 12% compound interest on child and spousal support in Title IV of the Social Security Act state family court proceedings, in violation of the uniform statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and

if the State opts to do so, between 3% to 6% simple interest, *not* 12% compound interest, targeting noncustodial parents victims. In welfare cases, support are assigned by the custodial parent to the State, and the 12% compound interest represents a fee for the State's "services" in the support's establishment and enforcement paid to the State, which at 12% compound interest represents lucrative, illegally obtained revenue to the State actors, who are financially incentivized to obtain as much as possible.

(6) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Tyler Technologies to knowingly fail to properly integrate Odyssey with the State's legacy electronic court filing system resulting in the State's filings seeking illegal 12% compound interest, as well as to deny the Public and to Pro Se Litigants' access to their publication of judge-created law records for the purpose of cover up of this wholesale illegal defraud of the court, extortionary defraud under color of state law targeting the unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims, and defraud of the United States (66% of the cost of these child support "operations" is funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services through Title IV of the Social Security Act through funds appropriated by Congress through the annual budget appropriations.)

(7) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to operate the Title IV Program of the Social Security Act in all manners violative of due process, *in prima facie* due process violative State Electronic Courts, for the purpose of generating state revenue through fraud and deceit, through conspired tortious interference of rights of access to the courts, rights of

access to state case documents, and rights of access to judge-created laws targeting litigants, targeting the Public and targeting Pro Se Litigants.

(8) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Tyler Technologies to cover up their public-access-denied publication of state judge-created laws of illegal 12% compound interest benefiting the state's revenue by adopting a State policy not to establish nor enforce any interest in *interstate* support cases only, calculated to cover up the collective fraud from federal enforcement officials and other states' enforcement officials of court orders (laws) showing 12% compounded interest established and funded under Title IV that are facially illegally violative of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) which explicitly provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between *3% to 6% simple interest, not 12% compound interest*. The federal Title IV Program regulation by Congressional intent explicitly preempts any related state laws of all participating states.

(9) The civil conspiracy by the Rhode Island Judiciary and the Defendant Department of Human Services and Office of Child Support Services and Barbara Grady and Gero Meyersiek to use the fraudulent, First Amendment-, Fourth Amendment-, Fifth Amendment-, Seventh Amendment-, and Fourteenth Amendment violative state court machinery weaponizing Title IV Program of the Social Security Act to target the Plaintiff *pro se* noncustodial parent in Texas to retaliate against Plaintiff for her past lawsuits against them, namely ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al. Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al. Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state

court's under color of state law abuse of the legal frame work of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if Plaintiff wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's **retaliation** damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where necessary, even if no party has requested it").

(10) The Rhode Island Judiciary continues the pattern of cover up by denying Plaintiff's request for public judicial records related to the monopoly of publication of judge-created records submitted to the State Judiciary pursuant to the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act ("RI APRA").

4. Plaintiff obtained new evidence on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary is a former client of Judge Smith, and on November 9, 2023, Plaintiff obtained new evidence that the

Rhode Island Judiciary remains a major client of Judge Smith's former law firm. Plaintiff's due diligence search for conflict of interest has been impeded by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of judge-created laws in the state's electronic court system and their denial of access to the judge-created laws, and Plaintiff, as a member of the Public and proceeding pro se without a Rhode Island Attorney license, the issuance of which is also monopolized by the Rhode Island Judiciary, has further been denied access to official records, including through the Rhode Island Access to Public Records Act, consistent with a pattern of civil conspiracy cover up.

5. A new trial or a stay of the Judgment is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to Plaintiff, and to Americans across the First Circuit who would be needlessly deprived of access to the federal courts of law in the First Circuit for monetary damages redress - the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention that functioned as a court of equity - regarding Plaintiff's monetary damages claims against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies' scheme to monopolize the publication of judge-created laws that denies, tortiously interferes, tortiously abridges and tortiously obstruct the Public access to those very laws; regarding Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services' unlawful seizures of interstate Texas properties outside of Rhode Island under color of Rhode Island state law based on legally insufficient interest charge on overdue support based on the unlawful rate of 12% compound interest that is disallowed under Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that provides States *may* opt to charge a fee, and *if* the State opts to do so, between *3% to 6% simple interest, not 12% compound interest*. And this is on top of Defendants' breach of contract that was brokered by Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services on behalf of the agency's client; the contract between the custodial parent client, defendant Gero

Meyersiek and the Texas Plaintiff stipulated that the custodial parent waived interest upon the Texas Plaintiff paying a lump sum of \$104,185.98 pay-off amount, which Plaintiff performed from Texas on December 7, 2021. Even at the point of contractual agreement, Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Services in conjunction with Defendant Gero Meyersiek, misrepresented there was lawful and enforceable interest to be waived, as they removed the accrued interest from the Title IV-D Program mandated support record system in order to cover up from the Plaintiff, and from federal and Texas authorities the unlawful 12% compound rate. After fraudulently inducing Plaintiff in Texas to agree to and to perform on the contract, the Defendants immediately put the interest back into the Title IV-D Program-mandated automated support record system and started to seize Plaintiff's properties in Texas under color of Rhode Island state law.

6. The final judgment is on its face violative of binding First Circuit caselaw that mandates lower courts to *stay* monetary damages claims when applying Younger Abstention. See *DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) in holding that abstention does not allow for dismissal of damages claim).

7. 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) has been in effect since the enactment of the Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act several decades ago, and Congress's original intent was to combat poverty within the populace of single mothers and children in welfare cases; Congress at no time intended to shift the undue burden of Rhode Island's 12% compound interest on overdue support under color of Rhode Island state law to noncustodial parents, whether targeting Texas or across the country, which in welfare cases Rhode Island converts the 12% compound interest to assigned debts owed by noncustodial parents to Rhode Island's state agencies and state

government, representing underhanded unlawful state revenue unlawfully obtained through the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, targeting unsuspecting noncustodial parents victims. As a legal point of a state's lawful application of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the First Circuit, New Hampshire, in compliance with the letter of federal law, opts into Title IV-D Program and opts not to charge any interest whatsoever, as per the letter of law and the original intent of Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). Similarly, Texas charges 6% in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A).

8. Defendant Rhode Island Office of Child Support Service's illegal denial and obstruction of access to Plaintiff's own child support case file that contains the incriminating illegal and arguably criminal scheme of removing the interest rate from the Title IV-D Program mandated and federally funded support record system to cover up the unlawful 12% compound interest from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from the Plaintiff in Texas, violates due process, obstructs justice, obstructs a federally funded and federal program proceeding, and the legal framework of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666.

9. Judge Smith's dismissal of Texas Plaintiff's legal remedy monetary damages and breach of contract fraudulent inducement damages claims under Younger Abstention in this Court of law represents irreparable harm violative of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment and the First Amendment access to the Court. The undisputable fact remains, Plaintiff's legal remedy request for monetary damages in this court of law consisting of twenty-two causes of action that cannot be dismissed under Younger Abstention, namely monetary damages claims of breach of contract fraudulent inducement, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation,

negligent misrepresentation, intentional/fraudulent misrepresentation, common law bad faith, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings, breach of fraudulent concealment/common law fraud, concealed fraud, tort of deceit, reckless indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiff, abuse of process, breach of duty, accounting fraud, fraud cover up, RI Government Tort Liability (R.I. Gen. Laws 9-31-1, *et seq.*), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim for Reckless Indifference of Plaintiff's Clearly Established Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of Fourth Amendment Illegal Seizure of Plaintiff's Texas Property, state tort of liability against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil RICO [ECF 25].

10. Judge Smith's legally-unsupported and factually-unsupported, and "legally insufficient" opinion that the limited jurisdiction family court is an adequate forum to raise Plaintiff's federal legal damages claims of breach of contract et al., contravenes Rhode Island law: R.I. Gen Laws 8-10-3 makes clear that family court is not a court of general jurisdiction, can only conduct bench trials functioning as a court of equity, not of law, and prohibits family court from exercising jurisdiction over breach of contract claims et al between the Texas Plaintiff and the Defendants; family court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's federal causes of actions; lacks the jurisdiction to summon a jury for jury trial in a court of law.

11. Finally, but equally critically, twenty-one days post judgment Plaintiff discovered troubling new evidence on November 9, 2023, that Judge Smith appears to have impermissibly acted in favor of the interests of the defendants – he is automatically disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455, because as a partner in his past practice and firm, the state government and the Rhode Island Judiciary were not only his clients, but continue to be that firm's major client under a flat fee contract and he has knowledge of the defendants' actions in this action – as a major

partner in his firm, the Rhode Island Judiciary is his and his firm's past and current clients, the state government actors and the state courts actors, cooperate in the routine establishment and enforcement of 12% compound interest under the legal framework of Title IV-D Program of the Social Security Act, where 12% compound interest is disallowed under 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A). To the objective observer, having knowledge of the facts and circumstances of this case, and being a partner in his past firm that continues to have the Rhode Island Judiciary as a client, Judge Smith appears biased in favor of the defendants' interest to continue raking in state revenue under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that explicitly disallows state debts of 12% compound interest assigned to Rhode Island that the state actors who cover up the 12% compound rate by obstructing the noncustodial parent's access to her own child support case file that is further violative of the due process provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 654 and §666, in Rhode Island's federally funded operation with funds appropriated by Congress intended for the *lawful* operation of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Although under the judicial self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. §455, the Texas Plaintiff is not expected to cull court records in the Rhode Island state courts for judicial conflict of interest, nevertheless the Plaintiff in good faith and diligently attempted to perform a remote search of Rhode Island's electronic court case management system, Odyssey in 2023. In so doing, Plaintiff discovered troubling newly-discovered evidence that the Rhode Island Judiciary, while publicly representing that the 2014 \$6 million state transition from paper courts to electronic courts promises *all court users* will be able to call up court documents remotely from their mobile devices, in reality Rhode Island adopted rules only denying the public and pro se litigants remote access to court case information, including pro-se litigants' own case records, that both the public and all litigants had equal statutory, common law and constitutional rights of access in paper courts – Judge

Smith's firm's clients, the Rhode Island Judiciary, therefore implemented electronic court public access denials that obstructed Plaintiff's and the public's discovery of Judge Smith's judicial disqualification regarding his former clients such as the state courts, the defendant state actors and other conflict entities.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

11. The United States Supreme Court in 2020 reaffirmed, in *GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC*, 590 U.S. ____ (2020), the century-old government edicts doctrine, making clear that officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot monopolize access—the works they create in the course of their official duties. The U.S. Supreme Court previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal materials when created by judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law shall not monopolize access to it. *See Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888). Tyler Technologies is a for profit organization that aims to facilitate public access to government judge-created records and legal materials. Tyler Technologies is contracted by the Rhode Island Judiciary to implement the State's electronic courts in 2013 and together, they both publicly represented that access to the contents of judge-created laws records will be readily called on mobile devices to *all* court users, namely, to the Public and to pro se litigators.

12. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their official duties as judges. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. In *Banks v. Manchester*, 128 U. S. 244 (1888) the Supreme Court concluded that “the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor. *Banks*, 128 U. S. at 253 (emphasis in original).

Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” *Ibid.* (citing *Nash v. Lathrop*, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N. E. 559 (1886)). These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253. This rule applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). *Ibid.* The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show . . . that all should have free access” to its contents. *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (cited by *Banks*, 128 U. S., at 253–254). Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. *Ibid.* (emphasis added). Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law, their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and must be “free for publication to all.” *Ibid.*

13. Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technologies monopoly of publication of the judge-created laws and their “whole works” making and interpreting the law that explicitly by design deny access to the Public and to the Pro Se Litigant runs afoul of the government edicts doctrine.

14. Courts have long understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. See, e.g., *Nash*, 142 Mass., at 35, 6 N. E., at 560 (judicial opinions and statutes stand “on substantially the same footing” for purposes of the government edicts doctrine); moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as judges,”

Banks, 128 U. S., at 253, it applies to whatever work judges perform in their capacity as judges. *Banks*, following *Wheaton* and the “judicial consensus” it inspired, denied publication monopoly protection to judicial opinions without excepting concurrences and dissents that carry no legal force. 128 U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted). As every judge learns the hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.” *Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980). Yet such comments are covered by the government edicts doctrine because they come from an official with authority to make and interpret the law. Indeed, *Banks* went even further and withheld publication monopoly protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges. 128 U. S., at 253. Surely these supplementary materials do not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doctrine. The simplest explanation is the one *Banks* provided: These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity. See *ibid.* The textual basis for the doctrine is the “authorship” requirement, which unsurprisingly focuses on—the author, the judges. The Supreme Court long ago interpreted the ‘author’ to be officials empowered to speak with the force of law. The doctrine distinguishes between some authors (who are empowered to speak with the force of law) and others (who are not). The Supreme Court explicitly rejects allowing the States to “monetize its entire suite of legislative and judicial history. With today’s *digital tools*, States might even launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.” See *Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020) It is obviously explicitly clear that the Supreme Court refers to the prohibition against the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s monopolization of the digital publication of DIGITAL COURT JUDICIAL COURT RECORDS that denies publication access of judge-created laws and their work materials to the Public and to Pro Se Litigants.

15. There is no legitimate Rhode Island government interest in the knowing illegal denial of access to the public and to pro se litigants the digital records of the Rhode Island Judiciary's and Tyler Technologies' illegal monopolization of digital publication of judge-created laws involving the establishment nor enforcement of unlawful 12% compound interest violative of explicitly clear 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) within the legal framework of Title IV-D Program targeting noncustodial parties in Texas who are outside of Rhode Island that Rhode Island already knows is unenforceable in Texas, and thus had removed the 12% compound interest in 2018 calculated to cover it up from federal and Texas authorities. Rhode Island's abuse of the legal framework of the government edict doctrine and the legal framework of Title IV-D Program are diametrically at odds with the intent of Congress and binding caselaws of the U.S. Supreme Court. The civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal machinery of the digital electronic courts in Rhode Island is clear. *See Turner v. Rogers*, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2011). *See Georgia v. Public Resources Org.* at 590 U. S. ____ (2020); *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, Section 8: Child Support Enforcement Program, in 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-1, 8-2 (2004). *See* Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351. Where the mother receives public aid, federal and state governments will provide the child support payment to the mother and hold the father indebted to the government for that amount. In cases where the mother is not dependent on welfare, the government has largely stayed out of the fray. *See* HOUSE COMM. WAYS & MEANS, *supra* note 38. Yet, this case does not involve a welfare case, as the custodial father is wealthy, but the Defendants are motivated by retaliation against the Plaintiff for suing them ten years ago in Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian

et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013), in which Plaintiff sued them, *inter alia*, for monetary damages claims for extortion by the Rhode Island state court's under color of state law abuse of the legal framework of another federal-funded human services program Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, through which Rhode Island demanded that Plaintiff pay the state court actor \$55,000.00 per visitation if she wanted to see her children in Rhode Island, because the state court stated in writing they believed Plaintiff married "a rich oil man" in Texas, absent any other legally sufficient basis. Plaintiff had reported this *prima facie* extortion under color of state law and under color of federal law 34 U.S.C. § 12471 *et seq.*, to the federal law enforcement authorities, *e.g.*, the F.B.I. in Texas and the Office of the U.S. Department of Justice in Texas. Here, Plaintiff's retaliation damages claims have been issues pending before the Court since September 1, 2023 [ECF 25], at which point Judge Smith was disqualified under the self-executing expectation under 28 U.S.C. § 455, additionally given the fact Judge Smith had also self-recused from Seguin v. Chafee et al., Civil No. 12-cv-708-JD (D.R.I. 2013), Seguin v. Bedrosian et al., Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD (D.R.I. 2013), and Seguin v. Suttell et al., Civil No. 13-cv-95-JNL-LM (D.R.I. 2013) ten years ago. *See In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[under §455] the judge is expected to recuse *sua sponte*, where necessary, even if no party has requested it").

II. ARGUMENT

16. Plaintiff has appealed the Court's/Judge Smith's judgment in its entirety in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023) and respectfully submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's

holding that the judicially created doctrine of Younger Abstention applies to the *dismissal* of her monetary damages and breach of contract damages claims.

17. Plaintiff further submits that she is likely to secure a complete reversal of this Court's in this case.

18. Conducting state proceedings funded by federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV of the Social Security Act in state monopolized electronic courts that violate the long-established government edict doctrine as it related to the Public's access of the digital publication of judge-created laws and violate the Constitution targeting Texas assets and Texas parties for illegal 12% compound interest involving fraudulent inducement that cannot be enforceable in Texas is the *prima facie* example of government fraud and government waste, warranting cut off from federal funding at the very minimum. Not even Judge Smith, friend of the Rhode Island Judiciary, can punt these egregious state activities to later addressment via the attention of the Supreme Court and to Congress Appropriation Committees, wrongfully using Younger Abstention.

19. Judge Smith's holding is defect in claiming without a shred of factual basis that Plaintiff can raise her federal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract claims in the jurisdictionally defective Rhode Island family court, that R.I. Gen. Laws 8-10-3 plainly states the family court is ***not*** a court of general jurisdiction, and which lacks the jurisdiction over the controversy for legal relief of monetary damages tort claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims over both the Plaintiff and all the named defendants.

20. Plaintiff seeks a new trial or a stay pending appeal as Plaintiff's likelihood of success on appeal, together with the lopsided balance of hardships, weigh heavily in favor of granting the stay being sought pending appellate review.

A. Plaintiff is Likely To Succeed On Appeal Of the Judgment Ordered By the Court:

21. Although Plaintiff recognizes that the Court has ruled against her as to the scope of relief, Plaintiff is likely to succeed on appeal of those issues, and has raised serious legal questions and presented a substantial case. *See Arnold v. Garlock, Inc.*, 278 F.3d 426, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2001).

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference her prior remedy arguments. Plaintiff reserves the right to make any and all arguments on appeal.

23. Among the substantial questions raised by Plaintiff is whether the Court erred in awarding Defendants dismissal of Plaintiff's monetary damages claim in this First Circuit under Younger Abstention and erred in failing to self-execute 28 U.S.C. § 455. And Plaintiff respectfully submits that she is likely to succeed on appeal in arguing that, in these circumstances, dismissal was not properly ordered in the particular circumstances of this case pursuant to established binding First Circuit caselaws on both the Court's errors applying Younger Abstention as well as judicial disqualification. *See DeMauro v. DeMauro*, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997); *In re Martinez-Catala*, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1998); *Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.*, 517 U.S. 706 (1996). *See also Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry*, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). ("Younger abstention does not apply to claims for monetary damages.")

24. Absence of a new trial or a stay of the judgment will erode confidence in the Judiciary in the First Circuit by creating an impression that it is violating national law regarding the government edict doctrine and setting illegal new national policy regarding the Title IV-D Program. It may also have the effect of “encouraging forum shopping.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). It further “undermines the judicial system’s goals of allowing the ‘airing of competing views’ and permitting multiple judges and circuits to weigh in on significant issues.” See also *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (traditional remedial principles account for “the public interest” and “the balance of equities”); *EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA*, 795 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.) (declining to vacate unlawful agency action under the APA because “vacatur could cause substantial disruption”). In this context, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state government tort monetary damages claims entered by the Court could cause substantial disruption to the *uniform* application of the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program Congress explicitly intended.

25. The serious legal questions raised in this case regarding the scope of remedy go beyond the questions of whether a Younger abstention is applicable to federal monetary damages claims and or the feeble assertion of *comity* applied to the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology’s gross violation of the government edict doctrine—and indeed, those questions should not have even entered into this case. Here, among Plaintiff’s challenges was to state Judiciary, Tyler Technologies and agency actions, and Plaintiff pursued fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims and tort monetary damages claims. Instead, the Court at law cannot vacate a federal statute—i.e., cannot “delete a previously enacted statute from the books” such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va.

L. Rev. 933, 936 (2018) (“The federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute. The power of judicial review is more limited.” (footnotes omitted). Legal monetary damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that would hold the Rhode Island state government accountable under the Rhode Island Government Tort Act for Rhode Island government actors’ tortious actions violating the legal framework of the Title IV-D Program federal statutes targeting the Plaintiff in Texas was a legal remedy conferred by Congress to federal courts to grant legal relief appropriate in this case. The Court has an unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction conferred to it by Congress. *See Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)

26. With respect, although the Court has entered a judgment otherwise, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Final Judgment sufficient to justify a stay of the judgment.

B. The Balance of the Equities Overwhelmingly Favors the Requested New Trial or Stay

27. The balance of the equities overwhelmingly favors a new trial or stay: The State of Rhode Island plainly lacks any legitimate interest in the State’s systemic knowing violation of the government edict doctrine and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A) that they now target Plaintiff in Texas, and which they sought to cover up from federal and Texas authorities, as well as from Plaintiff, by knowingly and unlawfully removing interest from the automated support record system. Americans outside of Rhode Island re fraudulently, unlawfully and systemically fleeced by Rhode Island’s illegal scheme that is illegally funded through the State’s defrauding of the United States lying to the United States that these activities are eligible for federal funds

appropriated by Congress for the legal administration of Title IV Program of the Social Security Act.

28. Defendants will face no harm from Plaintiff's requested new trial or stay. The judgment that is specifically directed to and protects the prevailing Defendants from legal accountability of their illegal actions, is further issued by a disqualified judge, Judge Smith, who was the former counsel for the Defendants and a partner of the firm whose major client is the Rhode Island Judiciary, e.g., Rhode Island state government entities, including the state courts and state agencies. The requested new trial or stay will thus impose no hardship on the prevailing Defendants at all.

29. By contrast, the public and the Plaintiff face significant harm if now new trial is ordered or the judgment is not stayed. As an initial matter, "any time a [government]" violates "statutes enacted by representatives of its people," the people "suffer a form of irreparable injury." *Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (citation omitted). But the harm here is much greater and more far-reaching. The government edict doctrine is willfully violated by the Rhode Island Judiciary and Tyler Technology in a civil conspiracy to cover up the illegal state family court creating judge-created laws ordering and enforcing 12% compound interest, aided and abetted by the Department of Human Services - Title IV-D requires the uniform application and compliance by participating States with the Social Security Act. Congress's as well as the United States through the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' interest in the uniform compliance of 42 U.S.C. § 654(21)(A), § 654 and 42 U.S.C. § 666 are well established. The States are reimbursed 66% of the cost of operations through federal funding appropriated by Congress under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The Defendants' arbitrary illegal removal of the illegal unenforceable 12%

compound interest from the automated support record system and cover up of their illegal 12% compound interest scheme from the federal and Texas authorities targeting Texas properties and targeting the Plaintiff in Texas demonstrates Rhode Island government agencies (who are former clients of Judge Smith) knowingly committed criminal schemes illegally seizing Plaintiff's properties interstate in Texas that they know are violative of federal criminal codes and Texas civil and penal codes. *See, e.g.*, Social Services Amendments of 1974 (1975 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351 (42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) (adding Title IV-D to the Social Security Act). The program, which is administered by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), provides that States with approved plans for child and spousal support that meet federal requirements are reimbursed by the federal government for a significant sixty-six percent (66%) of the costs of operating their child-support enforcement programs. 42 U.S.C. §v655(a)(2)(C). In 1975, Congress adopted Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. §v651 et seq., and established the general statutory framework that exists today. See 1975 Act § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2351; *Blessing v. Freestone*, 520 U.S. 329, 333-335 (1997) (describing program). Congress ultimately set the federal share of reimbursable expenditures at 66%, 42 U.S.C. 655(a)(2), but expanded the availability of matching funds at the 90% level for State expenditures for automating data processing systems to improve “the monitoring of support payments, the maintenance of accurate records regarding the payment of support. Therefore, the Defendants’ illegal operations cannot be funded by Congressional appropriations.

30. Judge Smith’s failure to self-execute his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 as well as Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Conduct, then his subsequent refusal to recuse in the related case, Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023), upon Plaintiff’s request after she raised newly discovered discovery post judgment

on October 6, 2023 of his direct and past public sector law practice's contract legal representation of the Defendants, state courts, state agencies and other conflict entities, have the appearance, to the objective observer, of the Court's issuance of judgment in favor of the Defendants in error that contravenes established First Circuit case law on Younger Abstention as well as disqualification, calculated to benefit the interests of his former clients, as partner of his former firm that represents the Rhode Island Judiciary and the state government.

31. Moreover, the Court's judgment effectively functions as a denial of Plaintiff's access to this Court of law to redress her legal monetary damages claims and fraudulent inducement breach of contract damages claims. It is well-settled that even minimal loss of First Amendment freedoms, "unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976) (plurality); *see also Elrod*, 427 U.S. at 373.; *N.Y. Times v. United States*, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971). Accordingly, Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits, will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, and a stay will not injure others while furthering the public interest.

III. CONCLUSION

27. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on appeal of the Judgment ordered, and has demonstrated that the balance of the equities favors a new trial or a stay. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court stay the final judgment for the duration of appellate proceedings relating to the related Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services et al Civil No. 23-cv-34-WES-PAS (D.R.I. 2023).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 16, 2023, I filed the within Motion with the Clerk of the Court via email.

Respectfully submitted,

Mary Seguin

Pro Se

/s/ Mary Seguin

Email: maryseguin22022@gmail.com

Phone: (281)744-2016

P.O. Box 22022

Houston, TX 77019

Dated: November 16, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

MARY SEGUIN,
pro se

Plaintiff,

VS.

Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-126-WES-PAS

RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES in its official capacity; MICHAEL D. COLEMAN, DEBORAH A. BARCLAY in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES in its official capacity; KEVIN TIGHE, MONIQUE BONIN, FRANK DIBIASE, WENDY FOBERT, KARLA CABALLEROS, TIMOTHY FLYNN, LISA PINSONNEAULT, CARL BEAUREGARD, PRISCILLA GLUCKSMAN, JOHN LANGLOIS, PAUL GOULD, in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM in its official capacity; PAUL A. SUTTELL in his individual and official capacity as EXECUTIVE HEAD OF RHODE ISLAND STATE COURT SYSTEM; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF STATE COURTS in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND SUPERIOR COURT JUDICIAL COUNCIL in its official capacity; THE JUDICIAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER in its official capacity; JULIE HAMIL, MARISA BROWN, JOHN JOSEPH BAXTER, JR., JUSTIN CORREA in their individual and official capacities; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL in its official capacity; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT UNIT in its official capacity; ADAM D. ROACH, PETER NERONHA in their official and individual capacities; TYLER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; GERO MEYERSIEK

Defendants

**MARY SEGUIN'S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)
MOTION**

I, MARY SEGUIN, hereby declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746(2) that the following statements are true and correct:

1. That I am the Plaintiff, Pro Se, in the above captioned matter.
2. That I exercised, am exercising and continue to exercise my statutory right to appear pro se party in the above captioned civil matter in federal court by statute 28 U.S.C. sec. 1654.

3. That in state proceedings in Rhode Island, I am required to comply with Rhode Island Article X. Rules Governing Electronic Filing, Rule 2. Official Court Record, (a) Official Court Record. “Upon the implementation of the Electronic Filing System (“EFS”) in each court, all documents shall be filed electronically and shall be the official court record.”
4. That the state proceedings in which I am a party are public and are not about child custody nor involve a minor.
5. That the **Rhode Island Family Court**, through its adoption and promulgation of **Administrative Order 2021-01 A2**) mandated that all child support interest matters shall be heard remotely via WebEx. Further, **Administrative Order 2021-01 B1**) mandated that all non-emergency filings shall be filed using the electronic filing system in accordance with the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, which is the **Odyssey system**.
6. That the **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION, Rule 5. Access to Case Information, (c) Remote Access to Case Information. (1) Policy. To allow limited Remote Access to the Database through the Public Portal. Non-public case types shall not be remotely accessible except for certain case types to attorneys who have entered an appearance in a case. (2) Content. (a) The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information”** bar, deny, violate, abridge, infringe and interfere with Pro Se Litigants’ and the Public’s fundamental rights to access public court records and Pro Se Litigants’ fundamental right to meaningful access to the courts. See **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” Rule 5(c)(2)(a)** **“The Public, Self-represented Litigants and Parties. The Public, self-represented litigants, and parties shall have Remote Access to the register of actions or Docket but shall not have Remote Access to other Electronic Case Information.”** See also **“RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY, Access to Case Information, 2. Remote Access to Case Information A. The Public, Self-represented Litigants, and Parties to a Case, The public, self-represented litigants, and parties in a case shall have remote access to the register of actions or docket but shall not have remote access to other electronic case information.”**
7. That I, the Plaintiff, learned and verified on July 10, 2023 directly from the Rhode Island Judiciary itself through numerous (14) correspondences with the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023, pursuant to my RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”) request for public records from the Rhode Island Judiciary, that as a matter of State policy, State Court Rule, and Judiciary Rule, in the digital courts implemented by the Rhode Island Judiciary, the State Court, the Rhode Island

Judiciary deny remote digital access of the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopolized publication of court and judicial records using the digital tool maintained and published by Tyler Technologies, Odyssey, including judge-created, judge-authored court decisions arising from state proceedings in the State's digital electronic courts, and digital court transcripts ordered by and paid by pro-se litigants that are published by the Judiciary digitally on Tyer Technologies' Odyssey are also denied access to the Public, pro-se litigants, and parties to the litigation (who are represented by counsel). The Rhode Island State Court only grants remote access to digital court and judicial records created by judges produced in digital courts to Rhode Island attorneys and state and federal agencies that are approved by the Rhode Island Judiciary's monopoly. On this matter, I corresponded in writing fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023.

8. That the State Defendants in this matter electronically file all notices using another electronic filing system that is even separate and different from the EFS (Odyssey).
9. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not noticed to me in Texas.
10. That the State Defendants' court electronic filings are not visible to me on the Rhode Island courts' EFS.
11. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by me, solely because I am a self-represented litigant.
12. That the State Defendants' court electronic filing court records cannot be accessed remotely by the public, by self-represented litigants, nor by parties to the case, but can be accessed remotely and instantly through the internet by attorneys in Rhode Island and state and federal agencies.
13. That the Rhode Island Court Clerks state to me over the phone that they are prohibited from reading the contents of the court records over the phone to me.
14. That the Rhode Island Court virtual clerks state to me over the phone that even they are unable to see or access the court record information of filings by the State Defendants from the virtual clerks' access portals.
15. That the Rhode Island Electronic Filing System, case management system, rules and practices outright and unconstitutionally restrict and deny access to the court to three classes: (1) the public; (2) pro-se litigants; (3) parties to the case (who are represented by counsel), and is obviously outright reserved for only the government and Rhode Island attorneys.
16. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS.
17. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and

withdrew from my-initiated RI EOHHS agency appeal in 2022 in a scheme to procure a favorable judgment in a state proceeding that deny my federal constitutional and due process rights in Texas.

18. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices, and initiated the family court state proceeding on January 31, 2023 before the Covid Emergency Declaration was lifted.
19. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the egregious due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that appear to **only allow remote, instant and full court access to a restricted club of R.I. lawyers and the government**, pose unconstitutional and undue burden on me, a citizen of Texas over 2,500 miles away.
20. That the State Defendant have full knowledge of the egregiously unfair due process violations of the Rhode Island state court EFS system/architecture/rules/practices that deny me access to the required electronic court transcripts prepared by the court reporter and electronically filed in the state EFS that **I ordered and paid for** for appeal, but the State Defendants have instant remote access by state court design.
21. That the State Defendants have full knowledge of the above unconstitutional restriction on access to court records and information to the public and non-lawyers is deliberate, by design and calculated to be unfair, violating constitutional guarantees of full and fair opportunity to raise claims in state proceedings.
22. That the above-raised unconstitutional restrictions are not exhaustive.
23. That my federal monetary damages claims on the unconstitutionality of the Rhode Island state court rules, practices and proceedings that violate the government edict doctrine and violate the pro-se litigants', such as my-self, federal constitutional rights: (1) federal constitutional right of equal access to the courts, (2) federal constitutional right to equal access to court records to receive information on the contents of all electronically filed notices, pleadings, court decisions, and transcripts that I myself ordered and paid for for appeal that are required to be electronically filed by state court rules and practices, (3) federal constitutional due process right and equal right to be given equal and timely notice of electronic filings and entries by the courts (including court decisions, court orders, court judgments, full docket entries, etc.) that the Rhode Island Judiciary deliberately deny by category all pro-se litigants access to court information, namely the contents of judicial/court records of cases to which I am the self-represented party, (4) federal constitutional due process right to be heard (Rhode Island Superior Court threatens me, the Texas pro-se plaintiff, with denial of my request to conduct WebEx hearings for the purpose of denying the Texas pro-se litigant access to the court and to be heard), (5) federal constitutional due process right to decision by a neutral decision-maker (the court that denies pro-se litigant

access to the court and the corollary opportunity to be heard fails the neutral decision-maker test). This list is not exhaustive.

24. That I seek to sue in federal court the State Defendants and add additional defendants.
25. I am an out-of-state diversity and a pro-se litigant in two state proceedings in Rhode Island, and have been unconstitutionally singled out by the State Judiciary, by category “self-represented litigant,” to be barred from accessing electronic case information authored by judges and which the Judiciary has a monopoly in the publication of the judge-created laws in which state court cases I am the pro-se party, and therefore have standing to raise claims against this unconstitutional state practice and unconstitutional state court practice and rules. I understand the Rhode Island Judiciary’s monopoly in the digital publication of judge-created laws in the Judiciary’ implemented digital/electronic courts and the Judiciary’s denial to the Public and to me from accessing the monopolized electronic publication of the judge-created laws in the court records violate the government edict doctrine.
26. Additionally, my fundamental First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and common law right to equal, meaningful, and timely access to judicial records and public court records in litigation, given timely notice, adequate opportunity to be heard and to decision by a neutral decision-maker are fundamental First and Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Critically, the unconstitutional abridgement, infringement, and denial of judicial and court records to out-of-state pro-se litigants by the Rhode Island State Courts, Rhode Island State Judiciary and the Rhode Island Superior Court Bench Bar Committee directly relate to Younger Abstention Exception.
27. The State Defendants deliberately file all the State’s pleadings outside of the State’s electronic filing system, “Odyssey,” and deliberately use a wholly different un-named electronic filing system, different and separate from that (“Odyssey”) provided for pro-se litigants, so that pro-se litigants do not receive any requisite automated electronic notices of court motions or pleadings the State Defendants file electronically, nor are pro se litigants able to electronically access the content information of the State Defendants’ electronically-filed pleadings. The only way the pro se litigant, such as me, the Texas Plaintiff, can access the court record is to personally go over 2,500 miles away to the courthouse in Rhode Island to access the court pleading information, or get a “courtesy notice” via email or get a “courtesy notice” through U.S. Mail sent by the State Defendants at whim. The State Defendants deliberately fail to send the notices electronically or by U.S. Mail, and the state courts deliberately promulgated court rules disallowing the public, pro-se litigants and even the parties who are represented by lawyers, remote access to court records, and critically, deny access to crucial court decisions, judgments and orders of public cases, as well as deny remote access to the transcripts ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal. Critically, the State court’s abridgment and denial of access to court documents to the pro se litigant and the general public result in the

unconstitutional abridgment and denial of equal, timely and meaningful access to court complaints, decisions, judgments and orders. What is truly shocking is that the Rhode Island Judiciary even denies and/or bars pro-se litigants remote access of court transcripts that were ordered by pro-se litigants for appeal.

28. Thirdly, the Texas Pro-Se Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 7, 2023, that the Rhode Island Judiciary, using the aforesaid state court rule barring, by category, pro-se litigants from accessing court case information remotely, bars the Plaintiff by category (“self-represented litigant”) from accessing state court proceeding transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. In other words, the RI Supreme Court Clerk stated to the Texas Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, in Texas, is unconstitutionally barred from remotely accessing the transcripts of court proceedings that she ordered and paid for in her appeal to the RI Supreme Court in the Plaintiff-initiated APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**, and yet the State Defendants are inequitably granted instant and free remote access to those very transcripts that the Texas Plaintiff ordered and paid for, for appeal. The federal Texas Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the verified facts.
29. Fourthly, the Texas Plaintiff discovered and verified the fact, on or about July 11, 2023, that, despite the Texas Plaintiff’s several phone inquiries to the RI Superior Court in the past several weeks regarding the status of the appeal, the RI Superior Court, for undisclosed reasons, failed and continue to fail to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer the court case file of **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** to the RI Supreme Court within the requisite 60 days after Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023, as required by the RI Supreme Court rules and procedures. At the same time, the Texas Plaintiff verified the fact that the Plaintiff-ordered transcripts of the state proceedings in the Federal Plaintiff-initiated state APRA action **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** show the RI Superior Court further unconstitutionally sought to deny the Texas Plaintiff access to the state court and opportunity to be heard by outright threatening the Plaintiff in open court that the Judge, David Cruise, during the hearing of March 24, 2023 in that matter, shall use the state court’s discretionary power in the future to deny all of the Texas pro-se Plaintiff’s petitions for remote WebEx hearings to effectively deny her access to the state superior court. The state court that denies court access and the opportunity to be heard fails the neutral-decision-maker test required under the Fourteenth Amendment. I now specifically request further the Court to judicially notice that this court access denial and denial to be heard occurred on March 24, 2023, PRIOR to President Biden’s lifting of the COVID-19 National Health Emergency Declaration. I, the Texas Plaintiff, aver this is a direct contributory reason for the RI Superior Court’s failure to transfer the case file to the Supreme Court within 60 days (by June 3, 2023) of the Plaintiff’s filing of Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2023 in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215**.

30. Fifthly, the Plaintiff presents to this Court and respectfully requests the Court to take judicial notice of the undisputed fact of the court rule-making process in Rhode Island. The 1966 Rules were promulgated by the justices of the superior court pursuant to section 8-6-2 of the General Laws of Rhode Island. This enabling act departed from the Federal Rules Enabling Act and most state enabling legislation conferring rule-making power on the supreme courts of the respective governments. The Rhode Island Enabling Act was adopted in 1940, 1940 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 943, sec. 1. It conferred the power on the justices of the superior court and the 1966 reform was the product of that court. In 1969 an amendment to section 8-6-2 made the Rules thereafter adopted by the trial courts subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 239, sec 2. Therefore, all public records relating to the adoption and promulgation of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION” are “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or “public body” means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to Public Records Act (“APRA”). Even though the Rhode Island Enabling Act conferred the power on the judiciary public body to promulgate and adopt court rules, a.k.a. rule-making process, the Rhode Island Judiciary, pursuant to the Plaintiff’s APRA request for public records, denied the Plaintiff’s APRA request within the 10 business day period, as well as denies it possesses public records, as defined by APRA, relating to the rule-making process by the judiciary of the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” including denying possession of public records that show the intent of the rule-makers to promulgate and adopt court rules denying fundamental right of public access to electronic case information remotely to the public, to self-represented litigants, and to parties to a case. See Exhibit D fourteen (14) APRA correspondence emails between the Plaintiff and/with Mr. Justin Correa, Esq. and Ms. Alexandra Kriss of the Rhode Island Judiciary from June 10, 2023 to July 10, 2023. The Texas pro-se Plaintiff respectfully requests the extension of time to present the new evidence and plead the newly verified facts and claims, and amend the complaint, which is further in the interest of judicial economy. The Plaintiff further seeks to appeal and file her claim against the implausible denial by the RI Judiciary, which is conferred by the Rhode Island Enabling Act to make rules of the court, that it possesses public records relating to the “RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY RULES OF PRACTICE GOVERNING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE INFORMATION,” that the judiciary, conferred power by the Rhode Island Enabling Act, “made in the course of, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency, ““agency” or “public body” means any executive, legislative, judicial, regulatory, or administrative body of the state, or any political subdivision thereof” as per R.I. Gen. Laws § 38-2-2, a.k.a. RI Access to

Public Records Act (“APRA”). Because the RI Superior Court clearly ruled in **Seguin v. RI Office of Child Support Services, PC-22-07215** that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear my/the Texas Plaintiff’s APRA-related claims, I, the Texas Plaintiff, now exercise my statutory and constitutional rights to petition this Federal Court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that provides supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims that arose from the same common nuclei of facts, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), and invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of civil rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. I, the Plaintiff, respectfully request this Court for the extension of time to file my claims.

31. Plaintiff discovered on October 6, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are former clients of Judge Smith, a partner in his former firm, Edwards & Angell.
32. Plaintiff discovered on November 9, 2023 that the Rhode Island Judiciary and Government Defendants are current clients of the firm Edwards & Angell, the former firm of Judge Smith, a partner in the firm.
33. A plain reading of 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 makes clear that Judge Smith is disqualified from this case, and a plain reading of case law makes clear that 28 U.S.C. sec. 455 is self-executing, without necessitating any party’s request.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: November 16, 2023

MARY SEGUIN



Mary Seguin

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